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Non-technical summary
Many countries are committed to emerge from COVID 19 on a more sustainable environ-
mental footing. Here we explore what such a structurally transformative recovery would
mean for the manufacturing sector of 14 major economies. We find that all countries have
zero-carbon growth opportunities post-COVID and comparative advantages in some sectors,
but industrialised countries and the East Asian economies, especially South Korea, appear best
positioned, thanks a push in low-carbon innovation that predates the pandemic.
Technical summary
We construct two indicators to assess the readiness of manufacturing in 14 countries to move
toward zero-carbon products and processes post-COVID 19. The first indicator is the extent
to which country-sectors have already started to convert to zero-carbon products and pro-
cesses. This is measured by the relative low-carbon innovation in different country sectors
(using global patent data). The second indicator is the ability of country-sectors to gain
and maintain market share. This is measured by existing comparative advantages, using the
Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage. Taken together the two indicators paint
an intuitive picture of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) faced
by different sectors, which can guide countries in their recovery strategies.
Social media summary
A zero-carbon recovery from COVID must be led by industry. It requires clean innovation
based on comparative advantage.
1. Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID 19) struck at a time when the world economy was starting
to move towards cleaner, environmentally more sustainable forms of production. The size of
the green economy is now on a par with global oil and gas and growing rapidly (FTSE Russell,
2018). The pandemic also hit at a politically important time for international climate action.
The parties to the Paris Agreement were expected to review, and ratchet up, their nationally
determined contributions to the agreement in the course of 2020. In anticipation, countries
such as France, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK had legislated net zero emissions targets
(Eskander et al., 2020). Over 1700 jurisdictions in 30 countries have declared a climate emer-
gency (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020).
To maintain this momentum, there are now calls for a ‘great reset’ (Schwab & Malleret, 2020)
and to ‘build back better’ (e.g. Allan et al., 2020; Stern et al., 2020), that is, to make the
post-COVID recovery Paris-aligned and environmentally sustainable. Much of the emphasis
is on fiscal support packages. By June 2020 over US$11 trillion in fiscal support had been com-
mitted to cushion the impact of the pandemic on households and firms (Sovacool et al., 2020).i
As the policy response moves from preservation to recovery, the argument is that a large part of
this Keynesian demand boost could be used to simultaneously advance decarbonisation.
Promising ‘green fiscal stimulus’ measures include energy efficiency upgrades for the housing
stock, investment in clean infrastructure and nature-based decarbonisation solutions
(Hepburn et al., 2020; IEA, 2020; for a more critical stance see Brahmbhatt, 2014).
In addition to this short-term, cyclical (or Keynesian) dimension, there is an important long-
term, structural (or Schumpeterian) aspect to a zero-carbon recovery (Bowen & Fankhauser,
2011). In addition to being timely and targeted (the hallmarks of a good Keynesian stimulus),
the zero-carbon recovery also needs to be transformational (Allan et al., 2020). That is, it
needs to support the long-term structural changes that deep decarbonisation requires, by pro-
moting clean innovation, re-skilling the work force and creating business confidence in the
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green economy (Zenghelis, 2014). EBRD (2020) also calls for bail-
out packages to be conditional on industry adopting decarbonisa-
tion targets.
However, the prospect for a zero-carbon recovery from
COVID 19 depends on business behaviour as much as it does
on government action. The zero-carbon transition will fundamen-
tally change the current patterns of industrial production and
comparative advantage (Perez, 2019), posing threats and creating
opportunities in equal measure. High-carbon activities will inev-
itably contract, but for the well-positioned, action on climate
change will generate opportunities for growth.
This paper explores to what extent industrial sectors are ready
to play their part in a transformative, zero-carbon recovery from
COVID 19. We are interested in the green competitive position of
different countries and sectors as they emerge from the pandemic.
These positions were built over many years, well before COVID
19, but they will now shape its aftermath and can help govern-
ments design their recovery packages.
The focus is on manufacturing, which is one of the biggest
contributors to the green economy globally (FTSE Russell,
2018). Specifically, we consider the manufacturing section in
the ISIC Rev 3.1 industry classification, focusing on the 15 largest
sectors by economic output in each country.
The paper uses a methodology developed by Fankhauser et al.
(2013). Using current economic output as the starting point, we
identify two potential indicators of zero-carbon competitiveness
at the sector level: the speed at which sectors may convert to zero-
carbon products and processes (measured by low-carbon innov-
ation) and their ability to gain and maintain green market share
(measured by existing comparative advantages). The two indica-
tors are more structural than the cyclical response to the pan-
demic. However, taken together, they paint a picture of the
long-term strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of dif-
ferent countries and sectors in a zero-carbon recovery.
In emphasising clean innovation, the analysis focuses on a par-
ticular type of economy: those that participate in frontier innovation
as a source of their competitiveness. We study 14 countries – nine
emerging markets and five industrialised economies – for which this
is broadly the case (Table 1). They are among the global engines of
technological innovation, and include some of the economically
most (France and UK) and least (China and South Korea) affected
countries by the pandemic. However, it is worth remembering that
for many other countries, technological competitiveness does not
derive from frontier innovation, but from their technological cap-
abilities and industrial capacity to adopt new technology (Bell &
Albu, 1999; Bell & Pavitt, 1993).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the com-
petitiveness prospects of a zero-carbon recovery from the point
of view of countries. Section 3 provides additional detail from a
sector perspective. Section 4 concludes with policy implications.
A methodological summary is provided in Appendix A.
2. Zero-carbon prospects at a glance
The creation of a post-COVID zero-carbon economy will affect
not just a few specialised sectors but the product mix and produc-
tion processes of virtually the whole economy (Perez, 2019). Some
sectors, such as coal mining or petrol refining, will contract, while
others, such as recycling or battery production, may grow. But for
most sectors, the zero-carbon economy is about adjusting existing
products and production processes. The construction sector will
specialise in zero-carbon buildings, the financial sector will pro-
vide capital for zero-carbon investment and the automotive sector
will produce zero-carbon vehicles.
Our conjecture is that the ability of country-sectors to respond
to this challenge depends on two key factors, both build over
many years. The first is the aptitude of a country-sector to convert
existing products and production processes to zero-carbon alter-
natives. We measure this aspect through green innovation, or
more specifically a green innovation index (GII), which puts
zero-carbon innovation (measured through patent counts) in rela-
tion to overall innovation (see Appendix A for details).
The second factor is existing comparative advantage. The
premise is that comparative advantage evolves slowly, and that
sectors with a competitive edge today are more likely (but not cer-
tain) to be successful in the future, benefitting from the ability to
diversify into related technologies (Hidalgo et al., 2007; Mealy &
Teytelboym, 2020). We measure comparative advantage through a
Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), a com-
mon measure of the trade literature (Balassa, 1965).
Plotting the two indicators against each other reveals each coun-
try’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats from a zero-
carbon recovery. Figure 1 measures on the y axis the green innov-
ation performance of different sectors and countries (GII). The x
axis depicts the RCA of those country-sectors (RCA). For both
indicators, a score above 1 signifies performance above the sample
average and a score below 1 means performance below the sample
average. The size of the bubbles measures a sector’s current contri-
bution (green and non-green) to national GDP.
Figure 1 can then be interpreted as follows:
(1) Sectors in the top-right quadrant signify strengths: these are
areas of current comparative advantage (high score on the x
axis) and there is substantial low-carbon innovation (high
score on the y axis), which should ease the conversion to
zero-carbon products and processes. The sectors are thus
well positioned to remain areas of competitive strength in a
zero-carbon recovery.
Table 1. Country groupings
Country
Impact of COVID 19













United Kingdom (UK) 11–14
United States (USA) 7–9
Note: The range in projected GDP loss is between a single hit and a double hit scenario.
Source: https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-forecast.htm (accessed 30 August 2020).
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(2) Sectors in the top-left quadrant signify opportunities: these
are not currently areas of comparative advantage. However,
there is significant low-carbon innovation, which could facili-
tate the conversion to zero-carbon products and processes.
The sectors could therefore become new areas of strength,
potentially displacing carbon-intensive incumbents.
(3) Sectors in the bottom-right quadrant signify threats: these are
areas of current comparative advantage, but there is insuffi-
cient low-carbon innovation. The conversion to clean pro-
ducts and processes may stall and market share may be lost
during a zero-carbon recovery.
(4) Sectors in the bottom-left quadrant signify weakness: these
are not areas of current comparative advantage, and there is
insufficient low-carbon innovation to build up a new area
of comparative advantage.
The power of these charts lies in the overall visual impression they
create about different countries’ position in the zero-carbon econ-
omy. We do not assign importance to specific numbers and delib-
erately omit sector labels. However, some descriptive statistics are
provided in Table 2.
The main industrialised economies appear well prepared for a zero-
carbon recovery. Global innovation powerhouses such as Germany,
Japan and the United States play a leading role in low-carbon innov-
ation, including in the sectors where they already have a comparative
advantage. The picture is more mixed for France and the UK,
Fig. 1. A low-carbon SWOT: country analysis. Note: Each bubble indicates the location of a country-sector on the GII–RCA plane. The size of the bubble indicates the
size of the country-sector, using output data from UNIDO. For each country, the analysis considered the 15 largest manufacturing sectors (in terms of output) with
at least 20 patents revealed comparative advantage. Source: Own calculations.
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which display more weaknesses and threats than for example the emer-
ging East Asian economies. However, overall it appears that the leading
industrialised countries have little to fear from a zero-carbon recovery.
Among emerging markets, the East Asian countries, especially
South Korea, appear best placed to prosper in a zero-carbon
world. Their levels of low-carbon innovation are close to or
above world average, with the majority of innovation scores
above 0.8, including in the most important sectors economically.
However, certainly in China and Taiwan there are also weaknesses
and threats to existing economic positions, for example in the auto-
motive sector in the case of China and metals in the case of Taiwan.
South Korea is an instructive example of how a robust innov-
ation ecosystem and explicit support for low-carbon industries
(Jones & Yoo, 2011; Mathews, 2012) can combine to produce a
favourable position in the zero-carbon economy. Almost all of
South Korea’s sectors are located in the top two quadrants of
Figure 2. In 2009, South Korea became one of the first countries
in the world to release a national law on low-carbon green growth,
which explicitly promotes eco-friendly engines of growth. Our
analysis suggests that this strategy of developmental environmen-
talism (Kim & Thurbon, 2015) is bearing fruit.
China has pursued a similar strategy with the same success in its
five-year plans. Starting with the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15)
China has put forward support for strategic green industries
(Green & Stern, 2017; Stern, 2011). The 12th Five-Year Plan puts
in place a host of preferential policies, such as tax exemptions
and reductions, special financing arrangements and favourable
loan terms for clean energy and energy efficiency projects. The
13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) has continued the momentum
for green growth by setting targets for increasing the efficiency
of industries, using more renewable energy and developing
green infrastructure.
Fig. 1. Continued.













Brazil 185 5.8 0.00–2.22 0.06–2.03
Mexico 26 4.2 0.00–1.47 0.29–5.01
China 14,330 5.7 0.33–1.11 0.26–2.42
India 314 4.0 0.00–2.98 0.28–3.93
South Korea 41,925 9.8 0.61–2.23 0.25–7.55
Taiwan 6872 4.0 0.05–1.33 0.01–10.06
Poland 274 9.3 0.00–2.37 0.52–4.74
Russia 229 8.7 0.00–3.36 0.15–4.12
Turkey 140 3.7 0.00–0.77 0.50–4.10
France 6638 14.9 0.45–1.42 0.47–1.75
Germany 27,180 11.5 0.19–2.19 0.43–4.93
Japan 134,851 9.7 0.57–1.31 0.15–4.16
UK 2465 9.6 0.00–1.82 0.13–6.64
USA 35,439 11.0 0.53–1.92 0.43–2.09
Source: Own calculations from EPO.
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In Emerging Europe, Latin America and South Asia the picture
is less favourable. Patent counts are noticeably lower (Table 2) and
green patenting is scarce, as reflected in the large concentration of
sectors at the bottom of the chart. The zero-carbon outlook is par-
ticularly precarious for Turkey, where clean innovation is some
distance from the world average in all sectors. Russia is a mixed
bag. It has a cluster of sectors that specialise in low-carbon innov-
ation and which also have an entrenched comparative advantage
(e.g. metals). However, it also has important sectors, such as
refined petroleum products, which underperform on clean
innovation.
Low-carbon innovation in these countries is often aimed at
reducing materials cost and increasing energy efficiency. For
example, Brazil, India, Russia and Turkey have all seen green
innovation in iron and steel, a sector in which costs (and emis-
sions) can be dramatically reduced through resource efficiency
measures such as the re-use of slag (a by-product of steelmaking)
and by switching to electric arc furnaces which re-use scrap
steel.
Mexico’s case is interesting because it highlights the differences
between green growth policies, which are aimed at supporting
low-carbon business, and climate change policies, which aim to
reduce emissions. Mexico is considered a progressive country
on climate change, with a thoughtful legislative framework
(Averchenkova & Guzman Luna, 2018). However, in the absence
of complementary industrial and innovation policies (OECD,
2008), this has not so far resulted in a favourable competitive pos-
ition in the zero-carbon economy.
Fig. 2. A low-carbon SWOT: sector analysis. Note: See Figure 1 for further explanation. Source: Own calculations.
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3. Some sector specifics
The previous section offered a deliberately broad, visual impres-
sion of industrial competitiveness under a zero-carbon recovery.
We now complement this picture with some sector details. We
look at 14 sectors that are of strategic importance to the zero-
carbon transition.
Figure 2 shows equivalent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats (SWOT) charts to Figure 1, but this time from a sector
perspective. That is, each chart plots the location of different
countries on the GII–RCA plane in a particular sector. The charts
allow us to speculate how disruptive a zero-carbon recovery might
be. In some sectors, the move to net zero emissions could dramat-
ically change the competitive landscape. In other sectors, the pre-
vailing order may continue.
We gauge the likelihood of disruption by looking at the correl-
ation between GII and RCA scores. A zero-carbon recovery is
more likely to lead to disruption in sectors where that correlation
is negative, that is, where countries are clustered in the top-
left and bottom-right quadrants of Figure 2. In these sectors,
there is a high prevalence of countries that either face threats
to their current position (low GII, high RCA) or have new
economic opportunities (high GII, low RCA). In such a setup,
incumbent operators could lose market share to zero-carbon
newcomers.
Conversely, a zero-carbon recovery is less likely to be disruptive
in sectors where the correlation between GII and RCA is positive.
In these sectors, countries are clustered in the bottom-left and top-
right quadrants of Figure 2. Existing market structures are more
likely to prevail because incumbent countries have considerable
strengths (top-right quadrant) and they face few apparent chal-
lenges from weak newcomers (bottom-left quadrant).
3.1. Potential for disruption
Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients (Pearson’s R) for the
14 sectors we consider. In six of them the GII–RCA correlation is
negative, suggesting threats to incumbents and opportunities for
newcomers.
The clothing industry is an instructive example (ISIC codes
171 and 181). Green innovation in these sectors relates mostly
to more energy-efficient production methods rather than more
salient or radical low-carbon innovation. Turkey seems to do little
to convert its production processes to energy-efficient and low-
carbon alternatives and could lose market share to newcomers
such as South Korea. China, which commands a sizeable propor-
tion of the global textiles market, also appears at risk. However,
the country has an entrenched comparative advantage, with
extremely competitive labour costs. As such, any takeovers in
this sector may be slow, if they happen at all, even though low-
carbon innovation is not driven by the current market leaders.
In the chemical sector, industrialised countries such as UK and
Germany have both a current comparative advantage and green
innovation specialisation. As such they are likely to maintain
their competitive position. However, elsewhere there could be
disruption. France and to a lesser extent the United States risk
losing market share to low-carbon newcomers such as South
Korea, Japan and China, which are innovating in low-carbon
chemical processes. If these countries can leverage their patents
Fig. 2. Continued.
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in catalysts, electrolysis and CO2 absorption methods as part of a
zero-carbon recovery, they may be able to expand their market
share.
3.2. Strong incumbents
In the eight sectors with a positive GII–RCA correlation market
disruption is less likely, although not impossible. In the market
for refined petroleum products (ISIC code 232), zero-carbon
innovation is creating new final products, such as biofuels, rather
than simply triggering process-related improvements. Leaders in
biofuels include the United States and South Korea, which
enjoy both a comparative advantage and high levels of green
innovation, should be able to retain their competitive position.
The United States plays a leading role in the transformation of
refined petroleum products, helped by policies which date back to
the 1990s. The US government ramped up mandatory quantity tar-
gets for biofuels, creating the space for growth and innovation in the
sector (although not always to the benefit of the natural environment,
Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008). In contrast, Russia could lose
market share to low-carbon innovators such as Japan, France and
the UK, whose notable innovations include biofuel improvements
and carbon capture and storage. Brazil has not been able to turn
its experience in sugar cane biofuels into a global competitive edge.
The market structure in the automotive sector (ISIC codes 341
and 343) also appears stable. Countries that have an entrenched
comparative advantage in conventional automotives find it easier
to diversify into zero-carbon vehicles, leveraging their existing manu-
facturing capabilities and skills. The development of hybrid and elec-
tric vehicles has been led by Japan, the United States, Germany and
other European countries that have an entrenched comparative
advantage in the auto industry and which could leverage their exist-
ing skills base to develop an ‘adjacent’ green technology (Unsworth
et al., 2020). Of course, a stable constellation at the level of countries
does not preclude market entry and exit at the level of firms, as we
could witnessed for example in the US automotive market.
4. Conclusions
COVID 19 will have a significant impact on climate change pol-
icy. The pandemic will shape both the economic context in which
climate policy takes place (Helm, 2020; Hepburn et al., 2020), and
public attitudes towards these measures (Howarth et al., 2020).
Even measured commentators were quick to draw parallels between
COVID 19 and climate risks. The International Monetary Fund
noted that ‘as with pandemics: (1) climate crises may look remote
but can strike quickly (2) preparedness is essential and takes years
and (3) the cost of preparing is dwarfed by the cost of not preparing’
(IMF, 2020). Well before the current pandemic, Martin and Pindyck
(2015) called the parallels ‘the economics of Scylla and Charybdis’.
Calls to ‘build back better’ go with the grain of a pre-pandemic
shift towards cleaner products and production processes. Our
analysis shows how the zero-carbon economy is starting to take
hold. The structural challenge for the COVID economic recovery
is to maintain this momentum.
Similar to all structural change, creating a post-COVID zero-
carbon economy will create both winners and losers. All the coun-
tries we analysed have existing strengths and new opportunities in
the zero-carbon economy, but many of them also face threats to
some currently well-performing sectors. With the notable exception
of South Korea and perhaps China and Taiwan, emerging markets
appear less well prepared for a zero-carbon recovery than the leading
industrialised countries. We identify sectors where clean newcomers
could gain market share (such as textiles and chemicals) and sectors
where innovating incumbents might prevail (such as automotive).
It is worth emphasising that we can only offer broad indications of
potential trends. The ultimate outcomes will depend on the far-
sightedness and determination of business leaders, whose actions in
turn will be influenced by the business environment in which they
operate and by policy interventions that either help or hinder the
zero-carbon transition. Creating a favourable business environment
for zero-carbon growth is therefore central for a transformative eco-
nomic recovery. This is a much more structural, long-term challenge
than the cyclical need to kick-start economies following the lockdown.
Table 3. Likelihood of disruptive change in sector competitiveness
Disruption in competitiveness Sector ISIC Rev3 Correlation coefficient
Likely Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 171 −0.386
Non-metallic mineral products 269 −0.363
Paper 210 −0.350
Wearing apparel 181 −0.314
Iron and steel 271 −0.030
Chemical products 242 −0.002
Less likely Parts for motor vehicles 343 0.043
Electric motors 311 0.048
Refined petroleum products 232 0.051
General purpose machinery 291 0.096
Motor vehicles 341 0.144
Television and radio transmitters 322 0.309
Precious and non-ferrous metals 272 0.337
Special purpose machinery 292 0.642
Source: Own calculations from EPO.
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Creating a zero-carbon business environment has many
dimensions. Having suitable market conditions to encourage
entrepreneurship, innovation, and trade are important enabling
conditions for economic success in general. The literature still dis-
agrees on the value of industrial policy to create these conditions.
Some authors argue that industrial policy has played only a minor
part in recent industrial successes (Pack & Saggi, 2006), while
others point to the need to overcome information and other exter-
nalities (e.g. Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003).
There is more evidence in support of clean innovation policy.
Environmental regulation can boost clean innovation, leading to
improved resource efficiency and ultimately higher growth
(Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Economies of
scale and the expertise developed in the domestic market may
then boost export opportunities through a home market effect
(Hanson & Xiang, 2004; Krugman, 1980). Clean technology sup-
port is also justified on the grounds of addressing barriers to low-
carbon innovation and breaking out of the world’s high-carbon
‘lock-in’ (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Aghion et al., 2016).
Although this paper has focused on economic rivalry and
competitiveness, a zero-carbon recovery has a strong cooperative
dimension. Countries that are not at the innovation frontier can
foster connections with and learn from the main innovation
hubs. They can tie themselves into green supply chains by provid-
ing labour, land and other input materials at competitive prices
for the manufacture of zero-carbon products. Access to technol-
ogy may spread through scientific collaboration, trade and tech-
nology diffusion, ensuring that the gains from frontier clean
innovation are widely diffused.
It is also worth remembering how changes in business com-
petitiveness link to national prosperity. What ultimately matters
for prosperity are real incomes and productivity. As the relative
demand for zero-carbon products rises globally, the countries
with a comparative advantage in them will benefit from improved
terms of trade and thus higher real incomes. But other countries
benefit, too, if their demand in clean products can be met more
cheaply and efficiently by suppliers with a comparative advantage
in producing them. This is the basic tenet of green growth.
Producers and consumers alike will benefit from a zero-carbon
recovery.
Data
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The manipulated GII and RCA data are available from the authors.
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Appendix A: Methodology
A.1. Approach
Our methodology is taken from and described in detail in Fankhauser et al.
(2013). The focus on future low-carbon competitiveness makes their approach
very suitable to study the structural aspects of a zero-carbon recovery.
Besides the interest in COVID 19, we depart from the earlier framework in
three ways. First, we provide more recent empirical estimates, extending the
original 2005–2007 numbers to the period 2005–2015. Second, manufacturing
sectors are analysed at the three-digit level of the ISIC Rev 3.1 classification,
while Fankhauser et al. (2013) provide results at the four-digit level. The higher
level of aggregation increases the robustness of results and permits the inclusion
of additional countries with lower patent numbers: 14 countries, compared to the
original eight, including nine emerging markets. Country sectors with fewer than
20 patents in total (green and non-green) are excluded from the analysis. Third,
we offer an intuitive new interpretation of our results in terms of SWOT, corro-
borated by selected examples of country-sector innovation.
The analytical framework tracks how the share of low- and ultimately zero-
carbon products and processes evolves across all sectors of the economy. We
define our variable of interest, Γis, as the share of low-carbon output in sector
s and country i, Gis, relative to total global output (green and non-green) in









The permutation, although self-evident, brings out the two key factors which
determine low-carbon output in a country-sector at any one point in time: (i)
the share of low-carbon output in total output in the sector, Gis/Yis (e.g. the
share of electric car sales) and (ii) the sector’s global market share, Yis/Ys
(e.g. national versus global growth in the automotive sector).
We explore each of the two factors in turn.
A.2. Tracking zero-carbon conversion
Our chosen indicator for changes in the share of zero-carbon output is low-
carbon innovation. The choice is consistent with the view that Schumpeterian
‘creative destruction’ will be the engine of transformative growth in the long
term (Archibugi et al., 1999; Oltra & Saint Jean, 2009; Perez, 2010).
Low-carbon innovation in turn is measured by the number of low-carbon
patents in each country and sector. The advantages and limitations of patent-
ing as a measure of innovation have been discussed at length (e.g. Griliches,
1990; OECD, 2009). Although patents are not a complete manifestation of
innovation, they are a core measure of innovation output that has been used
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successfully in numerous studies of green innovation (e.g. Dechezleprêtre et al.,
2011; Johnstone et al., 2010; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996; Popp, 2002).
Specifically, we use data from the European Patent Office (EPO) on world-
wide patenting activity from 2005 to 2015. The EPO classification system
includes a code for climate change mitigation patents (the Y02 class of
patents), which allows for an easy delineation between high and low-carbon
innovation. Patents were allocated to sectors by matching the name of the
patent holder to their sector of activity.









where pGis is the number of low-carbon patents and pis the total number of
patents in sector s and country i. The index thus measures the share of low-
carbon patenting in a country-sector, compared to the share of low-carbon
patenting in that sector over the entire reference area.ii The normalisation
against broader patenting activity is important to correct for idiosyncrasies
in patenting behaviour in particular sectors or countries. However, one side
effect is that the scores for large countries, which are a significant part of
the denominator, tend to converge towards one.
A.3. Tracking zero-carbon competitiveness
Our chosen indicator to measure zero-carbon competitiveness is current com-
parative advantage. The choice is consistent with the premise that zero-carbon
competitiveness is likely to be derived from existing comparative advantages,
skills and production patterns (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2010; Hidalgo et al.,
2007). Comparative advantage evolves slowly as countries diversify into related
technologies. This does not preclude market entry and exit at the firm level,
since new market entrants will benefit from existing competencies.
A widely used measure of comparative advantage is export share (e.g.
Rammer et al., 2017) and specifically the Balassa index of RCA (see Balassa,
1965). There are several variants of the Balassa index, each with its own advan-
tages and disadvantages (Iapadre, 2001; Laursen, 1998). The standard formu-










where eis is the level of exports from sector s in country i. The numerator mea-
sures the share of exports in a country-sector, relative to total exports from that
country. This is put in proportion to the same ratio (sector exports over total
exports) for all countries in the sample.iii The focus in the RCA formula is thus
on sector exports relative to a country’s total exports, i.e. on a country’s com-
parative (rather than absolute) advantage.
The RCA index is calculated using trade data for the period from 2005 to
2015 from United Nations International Trade Statistics Database
(COMTRADE).iv We use RCA to track changes in comparative advantage.
The higher the relative share of exports in a country-sector, the higher is its
RCA and the more competitive is the sector. A high RCA is an indication
of the ability of a country-sector to gain and maintain market share in the
future.
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